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Proposed by Jeff Halper
For all of us who have worked over the years for a just resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, this seems to be our moment of truth. Although our attention is understandably on the war against Iraq, we must not forget the "second front" of the same war for hegemony, the Palestinian-Israeli front. For the past eight months the "Quartet" - Europe, the UN, Russia and the US - have been formulating their "road map" for ending the Occupation and establishing, in the words of the December draft, "an independent, democratic, and viable Palestinian state" by the year 2005. Tony Blair, who is desperate for progress in the Middle East that will offset his support of the war against Iraq, has spoken passionately of an "even-handed" approach that links stability in a post-Saddam Middle East to the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. He has prodded Bush to make a formal, personal (if terse) statement of support for early implementation of the road map, and in his own statement the same day (March 14) asked us all to "hold me to it [the road map]." So pressing is this "front" that Blair and Bush have announced that they will pursue the road map even during the war. This, it seems to me, is an international intiative that we cannot afford to sit out. It opens a window of opportunity for us that, if not seized, will put off subsequent efforts to resolve the conflict for years, with all the implications that holds for Palestinian aspirations of self-determination.
The global anti-war movement has demonstrated its growing power. We have passed the critical threshold from being a collection of small, marginal, grassroots groups to a well-organized part of the international civil society with considerable clout. The thousands of NGOs, faith-based organizations, political and university groups, trade unions and concerned individuals that are engaged in the struggle for a just peace between Palestinians and Israelis comprise an important part of that movement. The time has come to engage actively with governments. The time has come to direct all our organization and clout at the political decision-makers in order to ensure that the road map truly addresses the issue of Palestinian self-determination in a viable state free of any trace of occupation. We must be active partners in formulating the road map. We must ensure that it contains specific steps and strict timelines that do not allow Israel to delay its implementation indefinitely, as in Oslo. And we must be sure that the Quartet, and not only the US, supervise and enforce the process.
This is the time to go beyond all our important activities - the struggle against house demolitions, the boycott of Caterpillar and Israeli goods, harvesting olives, monitoring checkpoints, delivering food and medical supplies, even protecting Palestinian civilians - to engage in a political process that could conceivably bring a just conclusion to all our joint efforts. In my opinion, two things need to happen now:
(1) We need to engage in an urgent discussion of the road map. Do we see it as a document that could lead to a just outcome, or does it contain fatal flaws? Those who feel that it is has no positive potential should explain why. It would be helpful to hear your ideas about how we should proceed, what you feel should be done to address the urgent situation of the Occupation. Those who feel that the document does have potential and that we should engage with our political leadership should point to the elements of the plan that are weak or missing, so that our advocacy can be as effective as possible.
(2) If the road map is a document we can work with, even with changes, how should we organize? Although movements such as the anti-war or anti-globalization movements are not built for negotiations (indeed, their participatory, non-hierarchical nature is intentional), networks of NGOs such as those that work on the issue of Palestine are able to develop agendas and campaigns, as well as organizing meetings, campaigns and lobbying efforts. We are capable of articulating positions on the road map and dividing our labors country by country. An international network of cooperating organizations already exists, although the ties among the networks of Europe, North American and other continents, as well as with groups in Palestine and Israel, should be tightened. The infrastructure of such a mobilizable network certainly exists.
Why I Believe We Should Engage Over The Road Map
For my part, I believe it is crucial that we engage our political establishments over the formulation and implementation of the road map. Let me explain why - although I also want to emphasize that my analysis is based upon the December 20 draft. Although the Quartet has announced that the document to be presented imminently is the December 20 text, a new draft that is significantly different may be a wholly different document that requires a wholly different disposition, especially if Israel succeeds in removing any reference to "occupation" or if conditionality has replaced mutuality. As of now, however, the road map appears to be have promising potential.
(1) The goals of the road map conform to the broad outlines of peace most of our groups advocate. They are based on the terms of reference of the Madrid Conference and the principle of land for peace, UNSCRs 242, 338 and 1397, agreements previously reached by the parties, and the Arab initiative proposed by Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah, as endorsed by the Arab Summit in Beirut. And they are far more explicit than those of Oslo. This means that Israel will be forced to articulate explicitly its concept of a settlement, bringing into the open its unwillingness to countenance a truly viable and independent Palestinian state.
(2) As set out in the December 20 draft, the road map's goals include:
* A negotiated settlement leading to a final and comprehensive settlement of the Israel-Palestinian conflict by 2005, including issues of borders, Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, and a comprehensive settlement among Israel, Lebanon and Syria;
* An end to the occupation;
* The emergence of an independent, democratic Palestinian state living side by side in peace and security with Israel and its other neighbors; and
* Addressing Israel's strategic goals of security and regional integration.
The fact that the road map uses the term "occupation" is in itself positive. It indicates that the Americans, who under pressure from Israel would not have used that term, do not have a veto power over its formulation. So, too, is the fact that the road map, backed by remarks from Bush and Blair, refers to a "viable" Palestinian state, and not merely "a Palestinian state" which, in Sharon's terms, would be a bantustan. The December draft requires the Israeli government to publish a declaration expressing its commitment to the establishment of an "independent, viable, sovereign" Palestinian state that will live in peace and security beside Israel."
(2) Besides being "goal driven," the road map is "performance-based," detailing the steps that the Israelis, Palestinians and Arab countries must take to advance from phase to phase. "Performance" is defined by clear phases and benchmarks agreed upon by the parties in advance, in contrast to the "constructive ambiguity" of Oslo. And "performance" is defined as a mutual obligation. The December draft calls for "an immediate end to violence against Palestinians anywhere," as well as end to expulsions, harm to civilians and destruction of Palestinian property. All official Israeli institutions will be required to "cease incitement against Palestinians." For their part the Palestinians will simultaneously issue a declaration affirming Israel's right to exist and an immediate, unconditional end to the armed Intifada, including all violent activity against Israelis, everywhere. The phases are defined in detail, and each is accompanied by a timetable.
(3) The mechanisms for supervising implementation and moving from phase to phase are promising, especially as they involve a wider international set of players - the Quartet - than did the American-centered Oslo process. One key element of the road map is the convening of an international conference at the start of Phase II, five months into the process. This conference, which will also begin the process of achieving a comprehensive Middle East peace involving Lebanon and Syria, places the peace process squarely at the center of the international arena. International involvement could be strengthened, says Ghassan Khatib, an insightful Palestinian analyst (and PA Labor Minister), if the UN Security Council would pass a resolution formally adopting the roadmap peace plan. Khatib also proposes that both the Palestinian and Israeli leaderships issue statements renouncing violence and committing themselves to seriously engaging in the process set out by the road map. The Palestinian leadership would renew its recognition of the state of Israel, which in turn will affirm its recognition of the Palestinian people's right to self-determination and establish an viable and sovereign state. To lend the road map legal backbone, each party would also express its commitment to abide by international humanitarian law.
(4) In terms of a political process, the road map is "the only show in town." Since governments still have the power to determine negotiations, we must engage with them when there is a possibility of influencing events for the positive, just as we must oppose and resist their policies when necessary. We cannot afford to sit out a political process initiated by the Quartet, especially since we have not advocated an alternative program. By "going with the flow," by taking the road map at face value and engaging in the process in good faith, we can bolster the initiative and make it very difficult for parties that attempt to undermine or destroy it. (5)
Shortcomings of the Road Map
(1) The Occupation must be made subject to international humanitarian law and UN resolutions. Israel has long maintained that its rule over the Occupied Territories does not constitute an occupation, a position that finds no support in the international community (although America's reclassification of the Occupied Territories as "disputed" has clouded the issue.) In its response to the December draft, the Israeli government stated that "The purpose of the road map should be an end to the conflictŠrather than an end to the 'occupation." It is this ambiguity, this neutralization of international law, that completely undercut the Palestinians' ability to negotiate from a position of parity during the Oslo process. Moreover, what constitutes the Occupied Territories must be made explicit as well: all the territories conquered by Israel in 1967, including East Jerusalem and the Latrun-area "No Man's Land." Vagueness in this regard means that the parties are negotiating over different territories, which defeats any peace process.
(3) The road map relies on too many incremental steps, each liable to assume disproportionate dimensions, while neglecting what were called in Oslo "confidence-building measures." The concept of a phased solution has failed, says Israeli analyst Yossi Alpher. "Phasing provided too many opportunities for the extremists on both sides to intervene." This suggests a missing stage between the explicit goals of the road map and its "performance-based" implementation. This is a translation of the goals into a comprehensive "package deal" that addresses, at the least, the fundamental causes of the conflict: the fact of the Occupation itself (including the presence of the major "settlement blocs," which even the most liberal Israeli analysts and politicians seek to retain) and Palestinian resistance/terror. Once these are articulated and agreed upon, they can be then translated further into steps of implementation. The connection between goals and results must be strengthened; the emphasis on process must be contained and substantially shortened. This approach conforms to the practicable timetable envisioned in the road map.
(4) Besides the technical aspects of peace-making, attention has to be paid to the material and emotional needs of both sides. If the Palestinians are to stop the use of violence, thus addressing the major Israel concern for personal safety, the violence of the Occupation must also cease and conditions of Palestinian life materially improve. In the first phase, suggests Ghassan Khatib, Israel must end its occupation of Areas A and B, end all measures that impede Palestinian freedom of movement, allow improvement in Palestinian economic conditions, cease meddling in internal Palestinian government, and refrain from any activities that will prejudice the final conclusion of talks (including Israeli settlement activities and the creation of other "facts on the ground").
Obstacles and Dangers to the Process
(1) While Israel formally accepts the idea of the road map, its 100 or so "amendments" to the draft run the risk of rendering it meaningless. According to Ha'aretz newspaper (March 16), "All mention of an 'independent' Palestinian state has been eliminated in Israel's response to the 'road map' prepared by the Quartet." Instead of "independence" (a term that Israel contends requires "clarification"), Israel is willing to assign a Palestinian state only "certain attributes of sovereignty." It is clear that Israel has in mind controlling 90% of the country, confining the Palestinians to dependent, non-viable and truncated mini-state on only 10% of the land. Israel also insists that the Palestinians waive the refugees' right of return.
(2) The success of the road map depends upon upholding the principles of mutuality and parallelism, rather than conditionality and "sequentialism." Israel rejects the concept of simultaneous, mutual performance as a benchmark of progress. Instead it insists that progress will be "conditional upon the complete cessation of violence and terrorism, full disarmament of terrorist organizations, their capabilities and infrastructure, the complete collection of illegal weapons and the emergence of a new and different [Palestinian] leadership." This puts the onus on the Palestinians, requiring them to give up all resistance to the Occupation and even facilitate Israel's "security" interests without any assurance that Israel will reciprocate in any meaningful way. A "performance-based" process must be a mutual one involving parallel Israeli and Palestinian steps, not one conditional on Palestinian concessions and later Israeli steps that might or might not happen. Indeed, in addition to overtly rejecting the idea of a viable, independent Palestinian state, Israel also rejects the demand that it remove its illegal outposts in Phase I, that it cease expanding settlements in the name of "natural growth," that it complete further withdrawals from the West Bank as agreed upon in previous covenants or that it will grant territorial contiguity to any Palestinian state. Using the same vague and non-committing language that characterized its approach to the Oslo process, Israel says it will consider a limited freeze on settlement construction only "following a continuous and comprehensive security calm."
(3) In order to ensure the a-symmetry of Palestinian requirements versus vague and uncertain Israeli concessions, Israel insists that the US be the only mediator empowered to determine the progress of the road map (and, indeed, the Americans have indicated that they will have veto power over the Quartet's decisions, unilaterally delaying release of the plan until after the Israeli elections and the appointment of a Palestinian prime minister). "We believe that the U.S. has a dominant and leading role in this process and accordingly the supervision mechanism should be led by the Americans," read an Israeli government statement. "Furthermore, we must agree on the nature of the supervision mechanism. It is essential that it include clear and specific subjects, that the supervision mandate be limited in time and that the members will be experts only. The Quartet may assist the process by supporting the American effort, but it cannot judge on issues such as determining goals for progress, judging on the transition from one phase to the next or addressing security issues." This stands in stark contrast to the draft road map which specifies that the Quartet collectively supervise the progress of the process. (4)
Adherence to phases and internal timelines is as crucial to the success of the road map as mutuality. Given the express unwillingness of Israel to countenance a viable, independent Palestinian state despite its declared acceptance of the road map, implementation rather than goal-setting is the key. The issue of moving from phase to phase was left open-ended in Oslo, permitting permanent "delays" in implementation, a flaw that eventually destroyed not only the process itself but the faith of the two peoples in it. Benchmarks must be clear and binding. Thus the provision in the road map which states "Phase IIŠends with possible creation of a Palestinian state with provisional borders by end of 2003" is so open-ended as to be meaningless. In its version of the road map Israel adheres firmly to Bush's June statement about "a Palestinian state whose borders and certain aspects of its sovereignty will be provisional," very different from "a Palestinian state with provisional borders." By insisting that the US be the sole determinator of performance and progress, Israel is placing itself in a position of determining or halting the progress of the Road Map. In order to grant the road map legitimacy, the Quartet must work as a team. No partner should have a veto power. Only a concerted effort by the Quartet as a unit stands a chance of success. Only that unit will display both the fairness and will necessary to achieve a just peace.
Although it is supposedly based on Bush's June 24, 2002 speech, American commitment to the road map is doubtful. Despite Bush's March 14 reiteration of his "personal commitment" to the road map, he did so mainly to boost the standing of a besieged Tony Blair. Bush's Rose Garden briefing was terse, and he took no questions. He presented the road map as an American document and process ("The United States has developed this plan over the last several months in close cooperation with Russia, the European Union, and the United Nations"). Unlike the road map itself, Bush made no reference to the Occupation, and his remarks clearly reflected a "sequential" conception - that Palestinians must first meet a series of conditions, including halting all violence and dismantling all terrorist groups, before a return to negotiations and any Israeli concessions - rather than the mutuality of the road map. . There are other worrying signs. One was the open invitation to the parties to alter the document ("We will expect and welcome contributions from Israel and the Palestinians to this document"), which could conceivably undermine it if Israel's 100 "comments" are incorporated. Another was the meeting with American Jewish leaders, convened in the office of Condoleeza Rice, in which she reassured them that American support for Israel is not in danger. "The President's statement was meant to strengthen Abu Mazen and help him win powers," she told the gathering. "We will lead the process and not the Europeans." Perhaps most worrying is the recent appointment of Eliot Abrams, a member of the extreme pro-Israeli "neo-com" circles, as the point person in the US State Department for the Middle East peace process.
For all the dangers and obstacles set out here, the road map still seems to deserve our serious attention, and involvement. There are forces in the American Administration, certainly today in the British government, in other European governments and in the UN who understand that the Occupation must go and that a viable Palestinian state must emerge. We of the international civil society must engage with them, offering our constructive criticism and views where necessary, monitoring the process in order to keep it transparent and "honest" (unlike Oslo), supporting the progressive elements in the various political establishments who can help advance the cause of a just peace.
Where Do We Go From Here?
The networks that form the core of organizations working on the Palestinian issue are already extensive and in more-or-less contact with each other. Some have initiated organized campaigns, others support activities "on the ground" in Palestine/Israel and raise their voices in different forums. This is the time, I argue, when we must coalesce around an international lobbying movement that mobilizes our networks and connections for advancing a road map that will lead to a just peace. In my view, there is a general consensus among us all as to what has to be done: end the Occupation completely and ensure the establishment of a viable Palestinian state, with serious attention to the refugee issue and addressing Israel's legitimate security concerns. After that, different approaches emerge - a one-state bi-national solution, a one-state secular democratic solution, a two-state solution, a regional confederacy and others. It is crucial that future processes of evolution in the Middle East not be closed off. The "Barak approach" of take-it-or-leave-it," of renouncing all possible developments in the future in return for accepting a "generous offer," of locking the Palestinians into a semi-viable state even if the Occupation ends, is unacceptable. The road map's attention to achieving a comprehensive peace in the entire region is also appropriate and crucial. As peace and economic development take root in the region, the evolution of political and economic units that reflect changing regional realities must be allowed to occur.
We must keep discussion of goals open, of course. But given the degree of consensus among us, the thrust of our lobbying efforts should be directed, in my opinion, at process -- the process of getting the road map adopted by the international community; the process of specifying in detail (and not subject to mendacious interpretation) the mutual steps leading from phase to phase; the process of implementation.
The international lobbying campaign would, in this first formulation, have three aspects:
(1) A short, immediate process of consultation among ourselves as to the goals and processes of the road map, as well as discussion as to how we should organize. From this process we can evaluate whether the different organizations and parties feel that the road map initiative is worth pursuing or not and, if so, specify what is lacking in the document and its processes. Since we lack a coordinated forum for such discussion and decision-making. I can only suggest at this stage that each country's organizations consult among each other and send their recommendations to the rest, including who the others should contact. Out of this a "sense" should emerge whether we should pursue the road map initiative or not. (If not, alternative suggestions should be offered.) Out of this focus, too, a more coordinated set of networks might emerge. We are now exploring the possibility of a joint Palestinian-Israeli working group that could help guide the process.
(2) If it is decided to engage in this lobbying effort, each national network should develop a strategy for engaging its political leadership, with suggestions over how the international network could support their efforts. Presumably this would involve meetings with parliamentary/congressional leaders and representatives both in their national offices and in their local ones, as well as engagement with decision-makers in the relevant government ministries. Given the fact that the road map has not only received the endorsement of the Quartet but is actually an initiative of the political establishment, we should have less trouble gaining access, letting our views be known and perhaps establishing formal (or semi-formal) frameworks for ongoing cooperation.
(3) Representatives of Palestinian and Israeli NGOs will meet with members of the Quartet's negotiating teams and their superiors, both in the region and, it is hoped, at an early high-level meeting of the Quartet.
(4) With obvious sensitivities to our contacts with political leaders, the lobbying campaign should be a public one in which we enlist both our memberships and the media to make our views known - especially in keeping the process honest. This watchdog function is critical. As our communications grow with the lobbying campaign, other forms of action will develop as well.
Consider this an open invitation to involvement. There are no "leaders" in this effort, although we here in Palestine/Israel are willing to help guide the process by providing information, suggestions and evaluations of the political situation on the ground. The actual draft text of the road map can be viewed on the internet (one site: Bitter Lemons). On the basis of that draft I have prepared a text that highlights the various elements of the road map -- the goals, the mechanisms and the phases - in a way that makes comments more precise. Thus after every section of the draft road map (labeled "Quartet"), I have added a space for "your comments/suggestions." As feedback is received and the discussion progresses (again, within a very short time-line; the near-final draft of the road map is due to be issued at any time), we can begin to shape the document for which we would collectively want to advocate.
This is truly a test of our effectiveness. If we choose to pursue this initiative, I believe we will rise to the occasion. If we decide against it, it will at least have prodded us to formulate an effective alternative.
Halper's framework for a detailed discussion of 'THE DECEMBER 20 DRAFT OF THE ROAD MAP